Case summary
What happened
On 2026-08-27, Moonwell disclosed a Base incident involving the MAMO Core Market. The post-mortem describes a combined path in which collateral accounting and MAMO price manipulation enabled excessive borrowing against the affected market. Moonwell's emergency response included setting Base Core Market borrow caps to 1 wei and MAMO/WELL supply caps to 1 wei. External security reporting estimated losses around USD 8.7 million, while Moonwell's own post-mortem separately reported remaining borrower obligations around USD 9.131 million after liquidations; CYA preserves those as different metrics rather than collapsing them into a single loss figure. Moonwell remained operational after the incident.
Customer result
Customer outcome
Unknown
No protocol-wide recovery percentage is inferred. Different loss/obligation figures in reviewed sources are preserved as distinct metrics.
- Estimated recovery
- Not classified. Reviewed sources establish a bounded market exploit and emergency mitigation but do not establish a completed uniform lender recovery or final recovery percentage.
- Repayment started
- —
- Repayment completed
- —
- Confidence
- High
Asset treatment
Terms risk
Customer-owned
Moonwell is modeled as non-custodial smart-contract lending infrastructure. This does not remove oracle, collateral, liquidity, liquidation, market-configuration or governance risk, and does not imply that every isolated market has equivalent risk.
- Affected product
- —
- Confidence
- High
Known unknowns
Uncertainty
The August 2026 incident is bounded to the Base MAMO Core Market and associated risk controls. CYA does not treat the external USD 8.7M estimate and the protocol's approximately USD 9.131M remaining borrower obligations as equivalent. No protocol-wide insolvency, universal customer loss, or completed recovery percentage is inferred.
Chronology
Historical record
MAMO Core Market exploit on Base
Moonwell's post-mortem describes an exploit of the Base MAMO Core Market that combined collateral-accounting inflation with MAMO oracle-price manipulation. Emergency mitigation sharply reduced relevant borrow and supply caps. External reporting estimated approximately USD 8.7 million of losses, while the protocol separately reported approximately USD 9.131 million of remaining borrower obligations after liquidations; these metrics are not treated as interchangeable.
Market-level incident. No single canonical loss_usd or bad_debt_usd value is assigned because the reviewed sources describe different metrics and scopes.
Source record
Evidence dossier
Filter by claim, reliability, source type, and whether evidence is linked to a specific event.
Entity
1 sourcesMIP-B48: Add MAMO Market to Moonwell on Base
Moonwell
Official Moonwell governance proposal documenting the Base MAMO market design and initial risk parameters before the later incident.
Event
2 sourcesPost-Mortem: MAMO Market Incident on Base
Moonwell Governance Forum / Anthias Labs · 2026-08-31
Protocol governance post-mortem describing the exploit path, emergency mitigation, exact onchain amounts and remaining borrower obligations after liquidations.
Weekly Governance Update: Week of Aug 24th, 2026
Moonwell Governance Forum / Boardroom · 2026-08-31
Moonwell governance recap confirming the August 27 exploit of the MAMO Core Market on Base and publication of the full post-mortem.
status
1 sourcesMoonwell Yield Backend
Moonwell
Official Moonwell repository providing current Base core-market and vault information, including market caps and live APR/APY data; supports continuing active operation after the incident.
No evidence records match the current filters.
Comparative records